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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on the concepts developed in the external governance literature this paper argues that 
the conclusion of the Schengen Association Agreement symbolises a qualitative change in the 
bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland. The argument on the qualitative change in 
the intensity of relations is developed by comparing the situation in Schengen related matters 
before and after the conclusion of the Swiss Schengen Association Agreement. Although the 
regulatory boundary was formally not shifted prior to the conclusion of the Schengen 
Association Agreement, various forms of policy transfer led to a high degree of policy 
convergence. In contrast hereto the organisational boundary was only ‘tentatively’ shifted in 
the pre-Schengen era owing to the fact that Switzerland remained excluded from the key 
implementation networks (SIS, Dublin). The conclusion of a dynamic integration treaty in 
Schengen matters shifts the EU’s regulatory boundary towards Switzerland in an 
unprecedented manner, a process that has been accompanied by a multiplication of 
possibilities for organisational inclusion. The article concludes by critically reflecting on the 
limited exportability of this advanced form of ‘flexible integration’. 
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Introduction 
 
The Schengen Association Agreement (SAA), which is a partial integration agreement in a 
core area of statehood, symbolises a new quality of interactions in the relations between the 
EU and Switzerland. The SAA constitutes a radical departure from the Swiss preference for 
agreeing on punctual intergovernmental agreements in the bilateral relations with the EU.
1 
The conclusion of a partial integration treaty means that Swiss domestic legislation in internal 
security matters has to be updated every time a ‘new’ Schengen relevant act is adopted by the 
EU institutions. The evolutionary character of the SAA has turned the area of internal security 
into a ‘laboratory’, in which the Swiss political system is learning to cope with the constraints 
and possibilities offered by the process of European integration. Some might be surprised to 
hear that such an advanced form of integration has been reached in a core area of statehood, 
but as Sandra Lavenex et al. have argued previously, the legacy of intergovernmental 
decision-making, flexible integration arrangements within the EU and the strong focus on 
operational or transgovernmental cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) matters have 
made this area particularly amenable to the emergence of ‘flexible integration’ arrangements 
in the relations with non-member countries (Lavenex et al. 2009; forthcoming). 
 
The first SAAs were concluded in 1996, when the negotiations on the association of the 
Nordic countries, Iceland and Norway, with Schengen cooperation were completed. As a 
result of Sweden and Finland joining the EU and Denmark becoming a Schengen member, a 
solution had to be found to intertwine the free areas of movement established by the Nordic 
Passport Union and Schengen. The SAAs, which are currently in force with the Nordic 
countries, were concluded in 1999 in response to the integration of the Schengen acquis into 
EU law under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Aforementioned SAAs served as model agreements, 
when the negotiations with Switzerland were conducted. In Switzerland political actors have 
been demanding a closer association with the Schengen states since the early 1990s. For 
instance in 1993 an expert group chaired by Nationalrat ‘Leuba’ asked the Federal Council to 
look into concluding an agreement with the Schengen states. The expert group feared that 
Switzerland was becoming an ‘island of insecurity’ for rejected asylum seekers and criminals. 
Prior to 2001 the Schengen states responded negatively to Swiss demands for association with 
Schengen. When, in 2001, the Feira European Council decided that the adoption of an EU 
directive on the taxation of savings would be made dependent upon the prior conclusion of an 
agreement with relevant third countries, the EU consented to opening negotiations on 
Schengen association in return for Switzerland’s consent to negotiate an agreement on the 
taxation of savings and the fight against fraud with the EU. 
 
                                                 
1 In the area of air transport an integration treaty was concluded under the first round of bilateral agreements in 
1999, but the far more limited scope of aforementioned agreement makes it difficult to compare the two..   3
The SAA negotiations with Switzerland proved difficult. The main stumbling stones 
concerned the adaptation of the partial integration treaty to the requirements of Swiss direct 
democracy and article 51 of the Schengen Implementation Convention on mutual legal 
assistance. In October 2004 the SAA was signed giving rise to the entry into force of the 
institutional provisions of the SAA. While Switzerland completed the ratification of the SAA 
in June 2005 following the ‘yes’ vote in the popular referendum of 5 June 2005, the EU only 
ratified the SAA on 1 March 2008 after all member stated had ratified the agreement. From 
April 2008 to October 2008 the Schengen Evaluation Committee assessed whether Swiss 
legislation and law enforcement practices were in compliance with the Schengen acquis, and 
after the positive conclusion of the evaluation on 27 November 2008 the Council decided to 
lift the land borders with Switzerland as of 12 December 2008. The ‘airport borders’ were 
abolished after the summer flight schedules were introduced on 29 March 2009.
2 Finally, the 
first referendum on a piece of Schengen implementing legislation will take place on 12 May 
2009, given that the facultative referendum was successfully launched against the introduction 
of ‘biometric or e-passports’.  
 
The following article empirically substantiates the claim that the SAA constitutes a qualitative 
shift in the intensity of EU-Switzerland relations. It does so by juxtaposing the scope of 
regulatory adaptation and the density of institutional or organisational ties in Schengen related 
matters before and after the conclusion of the SAA. The comparison will reveal that the 
relations have been deepened both at the regulatory and the organisational level. The first 
section summarises the external governance literature, from which the key concepts have been 
derived. In section two the situation before the conclusion of the SAA is illustrated, while 
section three presents the situation after the SAA. The conclusion summarises the main 
findings and critically reflects on the findings presented in the study. 
 
 
Applying a governance approach to the relations with Switzerland in Schengen matters
3 
 
The expansion of institutionalised patterns of interaction to the international realm is part of a 
broader ‘governance’ turn in the academic literature on the EU. The protagonists of the 
governance approach refute the dominance of the actors-based analysis of EU external 
relations by claiming that the EU is first of all a regional integration project that by its mere 
existence has intended and unintended effects on the policies of neighbouring countries. 
These outcomes in terms of policy transfer are, in turn, influenced by the institutional set-up 
of the EU. Indeed it has been shown that in particular so-called new modes of horizontal 
                                                 
2 Council Decision of 27 November 2008 on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the 
Swiss Confederation (2008/903/EC), OJ L 327/15. 
3 This conceptual section summarises the framework developed by the Newgov project team (S. Lavenex, D. 
Lehmkuhl and N. Wichmann).   4
governance, such as intensive transgovernmentalism in the area of JHA (on 
transgovernmentalism cf. Lavenex 2009), are more open to the inclusion of non-member 
countries than more hierarchical modes of governance such as supranationalism, which is the 
traditional Community method (Lavenex et al. 2007; 2009). The notion of external 
governance has been coined to capture these various attempts by the EU to include third 
countries into the realisation of its internal policy objectives (Lavenex 2004).  
 
The external governance approach draws on the studies of eastern enlargement that had 
analysed how the EU expanded its system of norms, rules and policies to the candidate 
countries (Friis 1999; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Aforementioned studies seek to 
identify the dominant logic of action displayed by the EU in relations with non-member or 
future member countries. In the context of enlargement it has been argued that the main 
mechanism through which the EU transferred its policies was governance by conditionality. 
The latter is a hierarchical approach in which the EU capitalises on its superior bargaining 
power in order to induce third country compliance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 674 
ff.). An analysis of EU-Switzerland bilateralism through the ‘conditionality’ prism makes 
little sense, considering that Switzerland does not want to join the EU, and therefore, the key 
mechanism of ‘accession conditionality’ is of limited use. 
 
The non-applicability of the conditionality model does not mean that the external governance 
approach is per se inapt to capture EU-Switzerland relations. What I propose to do instead is 
to analyse EU-Switzerland relations in the Schengen domain as a manifestation of ‘network 
governance’, which is a second type of external governance (cf. e.g. Lavenex et al. 2007: 
370). The choice of network governance in this case study is particularly pertinent, as prior 
studies have revealed that network governance features prominently in EU-Switzerland 
relations (cf. e.g. Lavenex et al. 2008: 325-326). Network governance denotes a constellation 
in which the EU and the partner country are characterised as equal partners. Drawing on Anne 
Marie Slaughter’s work on transgovernmental networks (Slaughter 2004: 52ff. ), Sandra 
Lavenex et al. propose a distinction between three different types of network governance 
(Lavenex 2008; Lavenex et al. 2007)
4: 
 
a.  information networks – they do not produce regulatory instruments but are set up to 
diffuse policy-relevant knowledge and ideas among the members. Usually, this goes 
hand in hand with the objective of distilling this information and identifying best 
practices. Expertise and professional reputation play an important role in these 
networks.  
                                                 
4 In order to avoid conceptual confusion with EU jargon Slaughter’s terminology is modified, and the terms of 
implementation instead of enforcement networks and regulatory instead of harmonization networks are used.   5
b.  Implementation networks - they focus primarily on enhancing cooperation among 
national regulators to implement/enforce existing laws and rules – be them national, 
international, or European. In EU law these networks are complementary to the 
hierarchical modes of governance in that they add a more cooperative implementation 
structure to the essentially unilateral decision-making process. Often, implementation 
networks also promote capacity building through technical assistance and training. 
c.  Regulatory  networks – they are the most powerful ones in terms of governance since 
they have an implicit or explicit legislative mandate and are geared at the formulation 
of common rules and standards in a given policy area. According to Slaughter, 
“behind the facade of technical adjustments for improved coordination ...and 
uniformity of standards lie subtle adjustments” of national laws (Slaughter 2004: 59). 
In so far as they are inclusionary and voluntary, these networks represent the most 
advanced form of flexible sectoral integration in terms of shared governance. 
 
What is common to both governance by conditionality and network governance is that the EU 
extends the reach of its rules towards non-member countries. Drawing on the work of Michael 
Smith on the different boundaries of political order (Smith 1996: 13 ff.), Sandra Lavenex has 
proposed to refer to this expansion of the reach of EU rules as a shift of the EU’s ‘regulatory 
boundary’ (Lavenex 2004: 683; 2008). A first indicator that external governance is present is, 
thus, that the regulatory boundary, i.e. the reach of EU rules and norms has been extended to a 
non-member state. What differentiates hierarchy from the network mode of governance is that 
the ‘network governance’ constellation refers to a parallel opening of the EU’s policy making 
structures, which is referred to henceforth as a shift of the ‘organisational boundary’. A shift 
of the organisational boundary occurs if the non-member states are granted access to the EU’s 
policy-making structures. Shifts in the ‘organisational boundary’ are assessed by analysing 
the institutional structures that have been put in place to accompany the adoption and the 
implementation of EU policies in the non-member country. 
 
In a previous article on external governance in internal security matters in the relations with 
the ENP countries it has been argued that the predominance of an operational instead of a 
legislative acquis and the existence of numerous law enforcement networks have favoured the 
inclusion of non-member states (Lavenex & Wichmann 2009). Whereas the securitisation of 
JHA issues and the absence of ‘trust’ in relations with ENP countries hinder these inclusive 
dynamics from fully unravelling, the homogeneity of problem situations and the high degree 
of political-administrative capacity in the Western neighbour states constitute favourable 
scope conditions for the emergence of network governance. The following empirical sections, 
to which I will turn now, illustrate that network governance has been present in EU-
Switzerland relations in internal security matters from the outset, but that this form of 
interaction has become even more prominent since the conclusion of the SAA.   6
 
 
Before the Schengen Association Agreement: unilateral adaptation and a “multilateral” 
compensation strategy 
 
Prior to the conclusion of the SAA the regulatory boundary was formally not shifted in the 
relations with Switzerland. Surprisingly the absence of a formal obligation did not preclude 
the alignment of Swiss internal security legislation and law enforcement practices with the EU 
member states’. It has been argued previously that the alignment with European norms was 
the result of two parallel processes: firstly, the ‘unilateral’ emulation of European standards in 
Swiss law, and secondly, a compensation strategy aiming to enhance Swiss inclusion in bi- 
and multilateral law enforcement networks to make up for the formal exclusion from 
Schengen (Möckli 2001). Following Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer I will argue that 
during the period lasting from the 1950s to 2004 the extension of the regulatory boundary was 
spurred by various informal modes of ‘policy transfer’ ranging from unilateral emulation 
(policy learning) to adaptation by negative externality (Lavenex & Uçarer 2004: 430).
5.What 
is particularly interesting in the context of the present analysis is that policy transfer has not 
only affected the content of legislation but also organisational structures and practices. 
 
The main change in Swiss immigration policy preceding the SAA was the alignment of Swiss 
policy with the EU’s core differentiation between liberalised rules for intra-European 
migration coupled with a restrictive stance on the immigration of third country nationals. This 
policy change was a direct consequence of the conclusion of the bilateral sectoral agreement 
on the free movement of persons in 1999. The popular approval of this agreement came as a 
surprise, considering that fears about the liberalisation of intra-European immigration were 
one of the main reasons why the Swiss population had voted against joining the European 
Economic Area (EEA) in December 1992 (Koch & Lavenex 2007). Nowadays the agreement 
on the free movement of persons is considered the most beneficial agreement for the Swiss 
economy; this explains why most political parties, save the Swiss Peoples’ Party, strongly 
supported its indefinite continuation during the February 2009 referendum campaign. The 
Swiss population has also expressed its support for the free movement of persons with the EU 
on numerous occasions by endorsing the extension of the regime to the new EU member 
states in September 2005 and February 2009. In sum, the changes made to the core principles 
of Swiss immigration policy were the result of the conclusion of the agreement on the free 
movement of persons, and not the outcome of a process of voluntary alignment. 
                                                 
5 Unilateral emulation emphasises the occurrence of voluntary ‘learning’ processes, during which one country 
takes over a policy solution that was previously successfully texted in another context. By contrast, adaptation by 
negative externality stresses the fact that EU policy measures can “alter the domestic interest constellations so 
that the costs of non-adaptation are perceived to be higher than those involved in a unilateral alignment with EU 
policy” (Lavenex & Uçarer 2004: 421).   7
 
In the area of asylum policy Switzerland was the first state in Europe to adopt the domestic 
legislation required to introduce the Dublin system. The Dublin system implements the 
general principle that the first member state or associated country that enables an asylum 
seeker or irregular immigrant to enter the joint territory shall be responsible for examining 
that person’s asylum request, and in the case of a negative decision, to return the person to the 
country of origin (e.g. Lavenex 2001). As a result of the federal decree of 1990 the federal 
authorities refused the application of asylum seekers having transited through safe third 
countries and asylum seekers having lodged a first demand in a Dublin state. Switzerland was 
also the first European country to apply the concept of safe countries of origin. Asylum 
seekers from safe countries of origin can be returned to their country of origin without an 
analysis of the merits of the asylum demand (Brochmann & Lavenex 2002: 64). A further 
illustration of voluntary alignment with EU standards in the asylum domain occurred, when 
Switzerland followed the EU’s approach of granting ‘humanitarian or temporary protection’ 
to the persons fleeing the violence in Kosovo.  
 
In recent times Swiss asylum legislation has increasingly diverged from the EU’s minimum 
standards, because Switzerland has adopted unilateral measures to curb asylum seeking. A 
case in point is the new Swiss rule stipulating that demands from asylum seekers without 
identity papers are treated as ‘manifestly unfounded’, unless the asylum seekers can convince 
the authorities in a first hearing that they have a valid asylum case (Maiani 2007: 823).
6 One 
of the reasons why Switzerland adopted more restrictive asylum laws was the country’s 
exclusion from the Dublin system prior to December 2008. It was feared that the asylum 
seekers having failed to obtain asylum in the EU would try a second time in Switzerland. In 
other words, the negative externality triggered by the exclusion from the Dublin system has 
been one of the driving factors behind the Swiss ‘restriction spiral’. 
 
Visa policy is a further illustration of alignment in response to a negative externality. In fact, 
the introduction of a ‘uniform Schengen visa’ for stays of less than three months had negative 
repercussions on tourism in Switzerland. In a nutshell, the problem was that the tourists 
needed two visa – one for Switzerland and one for the Schengen area - if they wanted to visit 
both territories on their trip to Europe. Since the costs associated with lodging two visa 
requests were considered disproportionate, many travel groups drove around Switzerland. 
This unsatisfactory situation led the Federal Council to declare in 2000 that the Schengen visa 
issued for nationals of Thailand and the Gulf States would be recognised as a valid visa for 
entering Switzerland. As a result of the unilateral policy alignment with the Schengen 
standards Switzerland did not have to make many changes in the area of visa policy, when it 
                                                 
6 Whether the more restrictive law in Switzerland proves to be an obstacle to the functioning of the Dublin 
system remains to be seen (Maiani 2007: 824).   8
became a Schengen member in December 2008.
7 The SAA has, however, had an impact on 
the practices associated with the issuance of visa, because the consular personnel now has to 
consult the SIS and register the issued visa in the Visa Information System. Overall the 
argument could be advanced that Switzerland made the most important step, i.e. renouncing 
sovereignty over the issuance of national visa policy, before concluding the SAA in response 
to a negative externality, which had arisen owing to the exclusion from the visa regime. 
 
Although criminal law has not been subject to explicit harmonisation efforts at the European 
level, a process of convergence can also be detected in this stronghold of national sovereignty. 
Convergence has been spurred by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the various conventions that the European states subscribed to in the framework of the 
Council of Europe and the EU (cf. e.g. Jörg & Swart 1995). That Switzerland has not 
remained aloof from the convergence trend is demonstrated by the fact that the 2002 
efficiency bill shifted the responsibility for prosecuting certain crimes with an international or 
inter-cantonal dimension from the cantonal to the federal level. The transfer of competences 
to the federal was followed by the creation of the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona and 
the granting of additional resources to the central law enforcement authorities. The bill aiming 
to introduce a federal procedural criminal code, which will replace the twenty-six cantonal 
laws, represents a further step in the centralisation process. Criminal lawyers have argued that 
the most recent reform proposal mirrors reforms that are underway in most other federal 
countries in Europe (Riklin 2006). In sum, convergence in criminal law matters has been 
triggered by a combination of alignment as a result of the conclusion of international 
agreements and of ‘voluntary emulation’.  
 
The intensification of international police cooperation has had an impact on the organisation 
of policing in Switzerland. Although formally the cantonal competence in police matters is 
unaffected by international cooperation, the conclusion of agreements in the policing domain 
has led to a strengthening of the central level (e.g. Aden 2001). Since international police 
agreements require designating one national interlocutor for the purpose of information 
exchange and assistance requests, a centralisation trend is observed in most countries. In 
Switzerland the central policing level was also strengthened, insofar as the 2002 efficiency 
bill introduced a number of federal crimes, for the prosecution of which a ‘new’ federal police 
authority was made responsible. The creation of the national Sirene office, i.e. the Swiss SIS-
contact point, has further reinforced centralisation at the federal level. Heiner Busch has 
shown that the Swiss copied the organisational model of the German Bundeskriminalamt with 
                                                 
7 Some minor changes were required as regards the alignment of the Swiss visa list with that of the EU, nationals 
of Bolivia and of some small states became exempt from the visa obligation (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominica, Fiji Islands, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kiribati, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and Grenadines, Salomon Islands, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu) whereas South Africans now need a 
visa to enter Switzerland (Bundesrat 2004: 179)   9
a federal police office that combines investigatory powers in the case of federal crimes 
(Bundeskriminalpolizei) and intelligence gathering functions (Busch 2001). Once again in the 
policing domain there is no harmonised European model, but since the national practices are 
converging one could speak of the emergence of European policing standards. 
 
In the area of law enforcement practice a number of similarities can be detected between the 
EU and Switzerland. For the most part, Switzerland has copied and emulated practices that 
were developed in other contexts. A case in point is the technologisation of law enforcement, 
which has been a trend all over Europe. It is a matter of fact that the European countries have 
been developing automated systems for storing finger prints, for exchanging information on 
sought and wanted persons and for strengthening the controls on their external borders. 
Irrespective of Schengen membership Switzerland was one of the first countries to introduce a 
central finger print data base, the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). This 
data base contains the fingerprints of all criminals and, more controversially, of asylum 
seekers. In 1994 the Swiss police also introduced a system for registering all persons, for 
which a search warrant was issued, the so-called RIPOL system. The police cooperation 
agreement concluded with Germany foresaw an exchange of information between the Swiss 
RIPOL system and the German INPOL data system.  
 
New law enforcement practices have also been introduced in the area of border control, 
insofar as the practices of executing ‘random checks’ and ‘mobile controls’ were relied on 
before the entry into force of the SAA. Mobile controls and random checks were necessary, 
because it was no longer possible to control all persons and goods in transit between the EU 
and Switzerland. In consequence only a minor percentage of goods and persons crossing the 
borders were checked in the past (about 1%) and about 40% of the personnel was affected to 
mobile controls (USIS 2003: 87-58). With the conclusion of the SAA the replacement of 
static control through mobile controls and random checks has become the official policy. 
 
So far it has been argued that Swiss and EU legislation and working practices in the internal 
security domain have converged, although no explicit obligation to align legislation existed 
prior to the conclusion of the SAA. This process of convergence has been fostered by various 
forms of policy transfer combining in particular voluntary emulation and adaptation in 
response to negative externalities. In addition to these non-intended forms of policy transfer I 
also found some instances, in which policy transfer resulted from the conclusion of bi- and 
multilateral cooperation instruments. Those agreements explicitly demand the alignment of 
domestic legislation with international standards. As I will show in the following section a 
number of these agreements were concluded before the Schengen Implementing Convention 
was signed in the EU, whereas others were created at Swiss instigation during the 1990s to 
avert the negative consequences of exclusion.    10
 
 
Organisational boundary: Limited inclusion in law enforcement networks 
 
To be able to exchange information and intelligence in an informal setting the European states 
created a number of transgovernmental networks. Among these groups feature the Club of 
Berne and the Club of Vienna (Lavenex 2006: 237, citing Bigo 1996 and Busch 1988). The 
consultations in aforementioned informal bodies have been continued to-date, for example the 
EU states meet with counter-parts from ‘like-minded states’ in the Counter Terrorism Group 
and the Task Force of Police Chiefs. It is interesting to note that Switzerland participated on 
an equal footing with most European states in these informal information exchange bodies 
inspite of its non-membership in the European Union. Alongside these informal information 
networks the European states also established formal consultation bodies, in which they have 
discussed the elaboration of new standards (regulation) and the implementation of existent 
rules. The modalities of Swiss participation in the formal groups vary on a case-to-case basis.   
 
Among the standard-setting setting bodies one has to mention the pivotal role occupied by the 
networks established by the Council of Europe. It has been argued previously that Switzerland 
has been an active participant in the law enforcement fora created under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe, e.g. in the CAHAR Group dealing with asylum, the Committtee on 
Migration, Refugees and Demography and the Pompidou Group (Lavenex 2006: 237). The 
first European standards on judicial cooperation in criminal matters were negotiated under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe. Indeed, judicial cooperation in criminal matters has been 
based on the Council of Europe Conventions on extradition (1957) and on mutual legal 
assistance (1959) for fifty years. The foundation of cooperation in the law enforcement 
domain under the auspices of the Council of Europe is the cooperation principle. The 
cooperation principle embodies two fundamental principles of criminal law, namely 
territoriality and sovereignty (Weyembergh 2004).
8 In the framework of the Council of 
Europe the European Economic Community (EEC) member states could not rally support for 
abolishing the ‘cooperation principle’, which is why they moved their discussions on 
cooperation in the area of criminal law to alternative discussion fora. 
 
One of these alternative venues was the Trevi Group, in the framework of which the EEC 
member states intensified their cooperation in the areas of terrorism and policing as of 1975. 
Trevi was organised in five working groups that met to discuss different aspects of internal 
security cooperation (fight against terrorism, police training/public order/hooliganism, 
organised crime/drugs trafficking, safety and security at nuclear installations, contingency 
                                                 
8 Other groups in which Swiss officials participated were the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum in 
Geneva and the Budapest Group. Both groups discussed measures to curb down on irregular immigration.   11
measures to deal with emergencies and immigration) (Bunyan 1993: 2). The consultations in 
the Trevi Group were conducted at the level of the Home/Interior Ministers as well as at the 
level of senior officials (Bunyan 1993: 1). During the course of its existence various non-
member states were granted observer status in Trevi. The observers were not invited to 
participate in the discussions of the Trevi group, but they were briefed by the `troika' officials 
after the meeting. Sweden, Austria, Morocco, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Canada and the 
USA were the privileged Friends of Trevi (Bunyan 1993: 1). Through these Trevi 
consultations Swiss officials were informed about what was going on in Trevi, and in 
particular, they learned about the launching of Schengen. What the Swiss did know at the time 
was that the Schengen Group would discontinue the practice of allowing non-member 
countries to attend its meetings 
 
As time progressed cooperation in the law enforcement became increasingly formalised. 
Formalisation also meant that the discussions took place in institutionalised settings such as 
the Schengen and the Trevi Groups, from which Switzerland was excluded. The absence of a 
strong lobby for Swiss inclusion in Schengen comparable to the pressure exerted by the 
Nordic member states on behalf of Norway and Iceland led to the EU explicitly rejecting the 
Swiss demand for Schengen membership (Möckli 2001: 135). Swiss demands for association 
with Dublin were never formally rejected, but since the EU never followed up on its promise 
to include non-member states in the Dublin system, it implicitly reneged on its initial promise. 
To compensate for the exclusion from Schengen Switzerland sought to intensify its network 
of multilateral and bilateral contacts. At the multilateral (regional) level it instigated the 
Alpensicherheitspartnerschaft, which is a forum for law enforcement practitioners covering 
the ten ‘Alpine’ countries. In this informal consultation forum information is exchanged on 
various internal security problems (organised crime, irregular immigration etc). Inspite of its 
ambitious objectives the Alpensicherheitspartnerschaft was not able to remedy all the 
disadvantages linked to the exclusion from Schengen. In particular the forum was not able to 
provide Switzerland with an access to the SIS information system. 
 
At the bilateral level Switzerland concluded police cooperation and readmission agreements 
with the neighbouring countries. The police cooperation agreement concluded with Germany 
goes beyond the Schengen minimum standards. It has four main components: “joint analyses 
of the security situation, mutual notification of current focus areas in fighting crime, a 
commitment to looking out for mutual security interests and a right of initiative to improve 
mutual security” (Crowe 2005: 424). The agreement grants the police officers of the 
neighbouring country extensive rights such as the right to conduct preventive and deterrent 
surveillance operations without any geographical or temporal restrictions (Cremer 2000). 
Moreover, the agreement authorises police officers to apprehend criminals on the territory of 
the neighbouring country. The clauses on the deployment of police forces and of equipment to   12
assist the neighbouring country during major international events are also exemplary in their 
reach. The Swiss have asked for German assistance during the meetings of the World 
Economic Forum in Davos and the 2008 European Football Championship. The police 
agreements concluded with France and Italy are classical police cooperation agreements. 
They pursue the objective of enhancing the exchange of information between law 
enforcement officials in the border regions. To facilitate the exchange of information between 
the parties Joint Police Centres have been created in Chiasso and Geneva.
9  
 
Overall the pre-SAA period is characterised by the absence of a formal regulatory boundary 
shift. Notwithstanding the absence of a formal boundary shift, a high level of alignment of 
Swiss legislation with European standards can be ascertained. This process of alignment is the 
result of various forms of policy transfer ranging from voluntary emulation to adaptation in 
response to the occurrence of negative externalities. At the organisational level I have 
detected a differentiated pattern of inclusion and exclusion of Swiss authorities in various bi- 
and multilateral law enforcement cooperation fora. The section also made it clear that the 
increased formalisation of law enforcement cooperation reinforced the exclusionary dynamics 
in the relations with the non-member countries. For Switzerland the most immediate 
disadvantage of exclusion was that the country did not have access to the Dublin system or to 
the SIS. The following section will show that the SAA grants Switzerland access to 
aforementioned networks but only in return for submitting itself to a far ranging shift of the 
regulatory boundary, to which I will turn next. 
 
 
A far ranging shift of the EU’s regulatory boundary through the conclusion of the SAA 
 
The far ranging shift of the regulatory boundary results from the fact that the associates have 
to take over the entire corpus of existent Schengen law as well as the further developments of 
the  acquis. Schengen cooperation creates a border-free area while at the same time 
establishing a number of ‘compensatory measures’ in the areas of border control, police and 
judicial cooperation, visa policy and with respect to asylum policy. The precise content of the 
Schengen obligations is explicated in Schengen Executive Committee decisions, legal acts 
adopted by the EU Council and various soft law instruments. Schengen relevant legislation is 
nowadays mainly adopted on issues pertaining to border management, return policy, visa 
policy and police cooperation. In contrast hereto immigration and asylum policy as well as 
judicial cooperation have been moved to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The 
decision on the Schengen relevancy of a legal act is adopted by the EU Council based in 
                                                 
9 The Joint Police Centres bring together the various authorities involved in law enforcement cooperation in the 
border region (police, judicial authority, border guards) under one roof. The presence of all authorities facilitates 
cross-border law enforcement cooperation by eliminating the transaction costs related to coordination.   13
particular on political considerations.
10 The uncertainty as to whether a measure will be 
defined as Schengen relevant or not constitutes a challenge for the associates, because they do 
not know whether a measure affects them or not (Wichmann 2006: 103-106).
11 During the 
negotiations on the SAA many Swiss policy makers expected that Schengen would remain 
relatively static.
12 This expectation has not come true considering that during the first four and 
a half years of Schengen membership the Swiss authorities have been notified of 78 Schengen 
relevant legal acts.
13 Though most of the acts have merely required technical changes, some 
have been politically salient such as the creation of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABIT), the Swedish Initiative on the facilitation of information exchange between the law 
enforcement authorities of the member states or the Returns Directive.  
 
The SAA is the first occasion on which Switzerland has accepted submitting itself to the 
obligation to align its legislation with EU standards in a dynamic manner. The majority of the 
other EU-Switzerland bilateral agreements, save the agreement on air transport, are static.
14 
Integration treaties exert a high degree of adaptation pressure on the associate non-member 
states. The pressure manifests itself in an obligation to ‘update’ domestic legislation in a 
dynamic manner, to follow closely the case law developments in the EU and to adapt the law 
enforcement practices to the Schengen standards. The pressure results from the overarching 
objective of the SAA, which strives to achieve legal homogeneity across the entire Schengen 
territory. The application of uniform control standards is particularly important in the 
Schengen area, because the Schengen system as a whole is only as strong as its ‘weakest 
link’. To ensure that the non-member Schengen associates apply the standards correctly, three 
key measures have been put in place: firstly, a dynamic incorporation procedure which 
ensures that Swiss law is ‘updated’ to developments in the EU, secondly, a Schengen 
evaluation procedure that is carried out before the agreement enters into the operational phase, 
and thirdly, an information exchange system between the authorities.  
  
Since the associate member states are not EU member states, the adoption of EU legislation 
does not have any legal effects on their domestic legal order; i.e. they are formally sovereign 
to decide whether they want to adopt a piece of EU law or not. This also means that an EU 
                                                 
10 In essence the EU Council has to choose whether it wants the United Kingdom and Ireland on board or 
whether it wants to include the three Schengen Associates in the discussions. 
11 Cf. the controversial question on the Schengen relevancy of the European Arrest Warrant in 2001. 
12 The author received this information in a number of interviews that she conducted in Brussels and Berne for 
her MA thesis on the SAA that she submitted at the College of Europe in May 2004. 
13 The Swiss Integration Office keeps a thematic file where the relevant information can be found on 
http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00500/00506/00510/00764/index (accessed on 20 February 2009). 
14 As a general rule the EU asks Switzerland to accept a dynamic incorporation obligation in the matters covered 
by an agreement, but Switzerland normally refuses. That this is a controversial issue comes to the fore in the 
Council Conclusions of 8 December 2008 on the relations with the EFTA states, in which the Council indicates 
that the static nature of the bilateral agreements has given rise to the “inconsistent application of agreements”; 
moreover, the Council demands that “any future bilateral agreements will have to ensure the “simultaneous 
application and interpretation of the constantly evolving acquis” (Council of the European Union 2008: 7-8).
.   14
legal act must be translated into Swiss implementing legislation, before it becomes binding on 
the Swiss authorities. An incorporation procedure has been put in place to ensure that EU 
legal acts are followed up in Swiss legislation (Cornu 2006; Epiney et al. 2007). In a first step, 
the Council notifies Switzerland about the adoption of a new Schengen relevant act. Once the 
official notification has been received, the Swiss government informs the Council of the 
constitutional requirements required to translate the EU act into Swiss law. In the case of 
minor (technical) adaptations the Federal Council can make the changes by executive decree, 
whilst political questions requiring the amendment of legislation are passed on to the Swiss 
Parliament. According to the Swiss Constitution decisions adopted by the Parliament are 
subject to an optional referendum. This means that if within 90 days after the parliamentary 
approval of a bill 50’000 signatures are collected, a referendum is held. In principle, 
Switzerland has to align its domestic legislation as soon as possible, but if a referendum is 
held, then the country is granted a two-year grace period to complete its constitutional 
procedures. Once the latter are completed, Switzerland and the EU complete an exchange of 
notes – an instrument of international law – confirming the application of the measure. 
 
A second measure to ensure legal homogeneity is the Schengen evaluation procedure that 
takes place before the operational phase of Schengen cooperation begins, i.e. before the 
internal borders are lifted. The evaluation procedure ensures that the Schengen member states 
do not only adapt the necessary legislation, but that they also implement the standards in 
practice. Schengen evaluation is a long process, during which the applicant country has to fill 
out numerous questionnaires on the legislative and executive measures it has adopted to 
implement the Schengen acquis. In a second step the Council’s Schengen Evaluation 
Committee examines ‘sur place’ whether the technical infrastructure is up-to-date and the 
rules are correctly applied. The Schengen evaluation process of Switzerland was completed in 
fall 2008. The favourable opinion of the Schengen Evaluation Committee preceded the 
Council decision of 27 November 2008, based on which the internal borders with Switzerland 
were lifted as of 12 December 2008. The establishment of information exchange systems 
between the Courts in the EU and Switzerland and between the administrative entities in both 
territories is the third measure for ensuring legal homogeneity across the entire territory. 
 
Together these various measures exert a high adaptation pressure on the associate member 
states, because they are backed by the ‘termination clause’. The latter stipulates that in the 
case of persistent differences in legislation, administrative practices and case law between the 
EU and an associate state, the SAA can be terminated after three months, if the parties do not 
reach an agreement in the Mixed Committee within ninety days. The termination clause adds 
an element of ‘uncertainty’ in the relationship between the EU and Switzerland, because no 
one knows what will happen if Switzerland refuses to adopt a piece of implementing 
legislation, for instance as a consequence of a negative referendum outcome. The uncertainty   15
arises, because no judicial authority has been established that is responsible for solving 
disputes between the parties. Dispute settlement is ultimately a competence of the Schengen 
Mixed Committee, which is composed of government representatives from Switzerland and 
the EU. The latter decides whether ‘persistent differences’ in application can be observed and 
whether these differences justify the termination of the agreement or whether alternative 
solutions allowing for the continuation of the agreement can be found. A first test for the 
compatibility of the dynamic incorporation procedure and Swiss direct democracy is 
scheduled for 17 May2009. To-date there are only speculations on how the EU will react if 
the Swiss population says ‘no’ to the parliament’s bill of 13 June 2008 implementing the EU 
Council’s decision on the introduction of biometric passports in the Schengen area.  
 
Overall the preceding section has shown that the degree of the regulatory boundary shift and 
the degree of adaptation pressure is high in Schengen related matters. It is against the 
backdrop of this unprecedented shift of the regulatory boundary that I will now analyse the 
EU’s decision to open policy making structures and the Schengen law enforcement networks 
up to the participation of the associate countries. 
 
 
Organisational openings: access to decision-shaping and participation in regulatory and 
implementation networks 
 
The most far reaching shift of the organisational boundary has taken place by the granting of 
far-reaching decision-shaping rights to the associate states. Although decision-shaping falls 
short of access to decision-making, it offers the associate states a number of venues for 
influencing EU policy making. The participation rights are most extensive at the preparatory 
or pre-pipeline stage of policy formulation, during which the Commission is obliged to 
consult the EFTA states experts when drawing up Schengen relevant legislation
15. These 
consultations normally take place in expert Working Groups, in the framework of which the 
Commission discusses policy proposals with representatives from the member states. At this 
stage of the policy making process no formal voting occurs and the associates can participate 
in the discussions on equal footing with the representative of the EU member states.  
 
Decision shaping rights are also granted to the associate states, when the implementing 
measures are drawn up by the Commission in the comitology committees. In the Schengen 
domain the comitology committees fulfil highly technical tasks, for instance they are 
responsible for elaborating the technical specifications for the biometric identifiers on the 
                                                 
15 The expert groups on the principle of availability, on data protection and on the common borders manual are 
mentioned in this context (Gutzwiller 2006: 251-252).   16
Schengen visa or for developing the IT infrastructure for the operation of SIS II.
16 These 
technical meetings are normally attended by the IT or fingerprint specialists from the member 
state Interior Ministries. The interviewees told me that in these technical meetings the best 
technical solution counts more than the nationality of an expert. While the participation rights 
of the associates during the comitology stage are extensive, they fall short of participation in 
decision-making. This means that when a comitology committee proceeds to voting on an 
implementing measure, the associate states have to leave the meeting room.
17 The decision-
shaping rights granted at the early stage of policy making and during comitology can also be 
found in the EEA agreement. 
 
What makes the SAA unique is that it grants the associate states an “active observer status” in 
the Council working bodies at the various levels of seniority. De facto the associate states 
have, therefore, been granted access to the core ‘legislative body’ in the JHA domain, the 
Council of the European Union. Formally the associates attend the meetings of the Council in 
Mixed Committee (COMIX) formation. In COMIX meetings the EU-25 (27 minus the UK 
and Ireland) and the Schengen associates discuss Schengen relevant policy proposals. For the 
associate states the possibility to participate in the COMIX Working Groups is the most 
important venue for exerting influence, because it is at the technical stage that EU legislation 
is shaped. The COMIX Working Groups are composed of senior law enforcement 
practitioners and of officials from the Ministries of Interior and Justice of the Schengen 
states.
18. Since the Working Groups normally discuss the technical aspects of the policy 
proposals, expertise and persuasion skills are key factors for exerting influence during the 
discussions. Apparently the absence of voting rights does not constitute a handicap at this 
stage of the process, because voting is rare and decisions are normally taken by consensus.
 19  
 
When the proposals leave the technical stage and are fed into the political Council machinery, 
the associate states’ influence decreases. At the SCIFA (Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum questions), Article 36 Committee (senior national interior ministry 
officials), Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives) and Council meetings the 
political aspects of the policy proposal are discussed. It is at these stages of decision-making 
that the absence of voting rights can become a disadvantage.
20 At the political level the 
associates predominantly rely on informal lobbying strategies, for example, alliance building 
with ‘like-minded’ member states to make their voice heard. The choice of the allies depends 
                                                 
16 Swiss experts participate in the following comitology meetings: VIS Committee, SIS II Committee, SIRENE 
Handbook, ARGO, data protection, Schengen Border Code, Dublin Committee and Eurodac Committee 
(Gutzwiller 2006: 250-252). 
17 Over time the Commission legal service has become more restrictive on granting the EFTA states observer 
status in the various Committees, but there are regular discussions on how narrow or broad the decision-shaping 
rights are to be interpreted (Interview Borgvad). 
18 The associate states have been granted access to sixteen Council Working Groups (Gutzwiller 2006). 
19 This observation was made by all of our interview partners in Switzerland and Norway (Ref) 
20 Interview information (Interview Borgvad).   17
on the issue under discussions; whereas in some cases the associates liaise with neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Nordic countries for Norway and Iceland), on other occasions they bond with 
states from further afield. For instance, when the original version of the Swedish Initiative on 
enhancing the exchange of information between law enforcement authorities was negotiated 
in the Council, Switzerland found allies in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, which 
were also opposed to surrendering sovereign rights to the EU in policing matters.
21 The four 
countries opposed the proposal for different reasons, but the result of the joint intervention 
was a watering down of the initial proposal.
22 
 
While the main change introduced by the SAA was the opening of the legislative working 
structures to Switzerland, the agreement has also enabled Switzerland to become a member in 
numerous regulatory and implementation networks. To my knowledge there are no ‘pure’ 
regulatory networks in the JHA domain, but a number of implementation networks have also 
been endowed with regulatory functions. A case in point is the Dublin Contact Committee, in 
the framework of which the officials in charge of Dublin cooperation in the member states, 
come together to discuss issues pertaining to implementation. When the officials discover that 
the application of the Dublin ‘hierarchy of responsibility’ leads to a contradictory outcome, 
they decide on a ‘common line to take’. Aforementioned Dublin Contact Committee decision 
thereafter applies to all cases in which comparable facts are observed. Put differently, the soft 
law standards established by the Dublin Contact Committee have a regulatory impact on the 
future application of the Dublin Convention.
23 No voting takes place at these expert meetings 
which is why the associate states participate on an equal footing. 
 
Access to the Schengen implementation networks has been the most immediate benefit of 
Swiss Schengen membership. The conclusion of the SAA has meant that Switzerland now has 
access to the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) and the 
Eurodac finger print system. In the Schengen area most information exchange nowadays takes 
place through these information systems, while the alternative systems of information 
exchange, for example through Interpol, are no longer used for cases involving Schengen 
members. For the Swiss police the possibility to access SIS is the key advantage of Schengen, 
in that it allows the country to participate in the real-time exchange of information on persons 
that are apprehended or sought for having committed a crime. Since August 2008 Switzerland 
has been connected to the SIS, and according to the Swiss law enforcement authorities the 
experiences with the new system are entirely positive.
24 
                                                 
21 Interview information (Interview Reto Gasser). 
22 Switzerland insisted on maintaining the principle of dual criminality for carrying out acts of sovereignty 
(observation etc) on the territory of another country. The distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud has sofar 
allowed Switzerland to uphold key elements of banking secrecy (Pfenninger 2007). 
23 Information received in interview with Reto Haberstich. 
24 On a first report see http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/SchengenSystem-funktioniert--55-
Kriminelle-geschnappt/story/13816850 (last accessed 22 February 2009).   18
 
As regards access to the Dublin system a separate agreement had to be negotiated, so that 
Switzerland could become associated with the Dublin regulation. Since 12 December 2008 
Switzerland has been an operational member of the Dublin system, and thus, it has been able 
to access Eurodac. The latter contains the finger prints of all asylum seekers that have lodged 
an asylum demand in the Dublin area. According to the first reports of the Federal Office of 
Migration the experiences with Eurodac have been positive.
25 According to an official report 
997 hits occurred, and 140 asylum seekers were readmitted to another Dublin state during the 
first four months of Dublin membership. In return Switzerland has been asked to take charge 
of 52 asylum seekers. The ‘material’ benefits associated with access to SIS and the Dublin 
system were the main arguments advanced in favour of Swiss Schengen membership during 
the referendum campaign. The SAA has not only allowed for Swiss participation in the 
Schengen networks, it has also acted as a catalyst for formalising the relations with further 
JHA implementation networks, e.g. in the framework of the agencies. 
 
During the last months Switzerland has begun to negotiate an agreement on the Swiss 
association with the EU’s Agency for the Management of External borders (Frontex). The 
association agreement specifies the Swiss modalities of association with Frontex, i.e. the 
financial contribution as well as all other rights and obligations. As the Frontex regulation 
2007/2004 constitutes a further development of the border management provisions of the 
Schengen acquis, Swiss association with Frontex is a direct consequence of the entry into 
force of the SAA. As an associate Frontex member Switzerland gains access to a whole range 
of Frontex activities. On the one hand, the head of the Swiss Border Guards will be able to 
participate in the meetings of the Frontex management board as an ‘active observer’ with 
limited voting rights. On the other hand, Swiss border guard officials will in the future be able 
take part in the Frontex joint training sessions. Moreover, they will gain access to Frontex’s 
joint risk assessments, and Switzerland will be invited to contribute to the joint Frontex 
operations. Finally, when the RABIT regulation is incorporated into Swiss law, the country 
will contribute personnel and infrastructure to the multinational border guard teams. 
According to an interviewee the main advantage of association with Frontex is that Swiss 
border guard officials are provided with an opportunity to expand their personal contact 
networks with homologues in the member states.
26   
 
The conclusion of cooperation agreements with Europol, the European Police Office, and 
Eurojust, the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit, is not a direct consequence of the 
signature of the SAA. In other word, no explicit linkage was made between the SAA and the 
conclusion of cooperation agreements with the EU’s coordinating bodies. Though officially 
                                                 
25.http://tagesschau.sf.tv/nachrichten/archiv/2009/04/07/schweiz/positive_bilanz_im_asylbereich (accessed 16 
April 2009). 
26 Mentioned as one of the main advantages by a Swiss interview partner (Interview Contin)   19
the two are not linked, it is interesting to note that the EU waited with the conclusion of the 
cooperation agreements, until the negotiations on the SAA were completed. Whereas the 
Europol cooperation agreement was signed on the same day as the SAA was concluded, 
Eurojust only opened negotiations with Switzerland pursuant to the signature of the SAA. The 
cooperation agreements define the rules for exchanging personal and strategic information 
between Switzerland and the EU coordinating bodies. In the case of Eurojust the cooperation 
agreement formalises the contacts between the Federal Office of Justice and Eurojust, which 
have existed for many years. It is a fact that Eurojust has asked Switzerland for mutual legal 
assistance in a number of cases in the past (examples cf. Eurojust 2008). Finally, the 
cooperation agreements allow the partner country to send a liaison officer to the 
Europol/Eurojust headquarters in the Hague. Switzerland has sent a liaison officer to Europol 
but not to Eurojust.
27 The cooperation agreements contribute to familiarising the parties with 
each others’ legal/policing system and they allow for an exchange of best practices among the 
participants. Finally, they contribute to enhancing the personal contact networks between law 
enforcement officials that are crucial for their every day work.   
 
The preceding sections have shown that the far ranging shift of the regulatory boundary in the 
Schengen domain has been accompanied by an opening of policy-making bodies and of JHA 
implementation networks. The qualitative shift observed with respect to the expansion of the 
regulatory boundary has, therefore, also had an impact on the degree of inclusion in the JHA 
networks. One may, therefore, conclude from this analysis of the situation before and after the 
conclusion of the SAA that there is a parallelism in the degree to which the EU shifts the 
regulatory and the organisational boundary in the internal security domain. 
 
It is important to note that this observation on a parallelism between the two types of 
boundary shift in the Schengen domain cannot readily be exported to other policy areas. It is, 
for instance, a matter of fact that the EEA, which is another example of an integration treaty, 
does not offer Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein the same extent of decision-shaping rights. 
Schengen association is therefore an exceptional arrangement that was devised in response to 
a specific problem at a particular point in time. Indeed, the first SAAs were established at a 
time when Schengen was still a purely “intergovernmental”
28 framework of cooperation, and 
it was developed to allow the countries participating in the Nordic Passport Union to travel 
freely in the Schengen zone (on this point see Bracke 2003). There is no doubt that it was only 
due to this Nordic precedent, which was established at the insistence of the Nordic EU 
member states, that Switzerland could demand such a favourable arrangement.  
                                                 
27 Factsheet on the Eurojust cooperation agreement retrieved from 
http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00499/00503/00683/index.html?lang=de (accessed 22 February 2009). 
28 In 1995 Sweden and Finland joined the EU and on 19 December 1996 Denmark joined Schengen. On the 
same day the first Schengen association agreements with the member states of the Nordic Passport Union 
entered into force. At this time Schengen was not yet incorporated into EU law.   20
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has argued that the SAA has symbolised a qualitative shift in the bilateral relations 
between the EU and Switzerland by moving the interactions from static intergovernmental 
cooperation in technical matters towards integration in a dynamic cooperation framework that 
touches upon core areas of state sovereignty. The existence of such a qualitative shift was 
demonstrated by comparing the situation before and after the conclusion of the SAA. Whereas 
the regulatory boundary was formally not affected in the pre-SAA era, various forms of policy 
transfer led to an alignment of Swiss legislation with EU standards. In the pre-SAA period the 
organisational boundary was only ‘tentatively’ shifted by allowing for Swiss inclusion in a 
number of intergovernmental and trans-governmental networks. With the entry into force of 
the SAA the regulatory boundary was formally shifted towards Switzerland, and the 
opportunities for organisational inclusion multiplied. From these observations I have 
concluded that in the Schengen domain there is a parallelism between the shift of the 
regulatory and the organisational boundary. 
 
The contribution has also demonstrated that flexible integration in the internal security 
domain entails a number of advantages and challenges for Switzerland. As regards the former 
one should mention that participation in Schengen allows for expanding the formal and 
informal contacts between the law enforcement officials working in Switzerland and their 
homologues in the EU member states. These contacts facilitate the every day contacts 
between the Swiss authorities and their EU partners. Moreover, Schengen association has 
allowed Swiss officials to make first experiences with the functioning of the Brussels 
machinery. Although everyone underlines the positive experiences the parties have made with 
the SAA (Council of the European Union 2008: 7), there are also some challenges. In this 
context, one has to mention in particular the upcoming referendum on the introduction of 
biometric passports, which shows that it is difficult to reconcile Swiss direct democracy with 
the legal homogeneity criterion underlying the Schengen territory.  
 
A final caveat needs to be added, when it comes to generalising the findings on ‘flexible 
integration’ formulated in the case study. First of all, there is no other EU policy area in which 
so far reaching concessions have been made to non-member states, and one may doubt 
whether the enlarged EU will ever make a comparable offer to a non-member state in the 
future (a similar reflection can be found in a recent report on the EEA, cf. Júlíusdóttir & 
Wallis 2007). A second impediment to exporting the Schengen model to other settings is that 
it relies on the fulfilment of a series of demanding background conditions. In particular one 
should not forget that the emergence of flexible integration in the area of internal security is   21
contingent on the fulfilment of demanding background conditions, such as a symmetric 
problem constellation, the absence of securitisation in the relations with the EU, and a high 
level of trust. Moreover, the third country has to have the administrative capacity to 
effectively participate in the EU’s working structures and to implement the Schengen 
standards. These enabling background conditions make it difficult to imagine that the 
Schengen model of ‘flexible integration’ could readily be exported beyond the circle of the 
EFTA member states, to which it presently applies. 
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